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Abstract
In many practical situations, a user needs our help in selecting the
best out of a large number of alternatives. To be able to help, we need
to understand the user’s preferences. In decision theory, preferences are
described by numerical values known as utilities. It is often not feasible
to ask to user to provide utilities of all possible alternatives, so we must
be able to estimate these utilities based on utilities of different aspects
of these alternatives. In this paper, we provide a general formula for
combining utilities of aspects into a single utility value. The resulting formula turns out to be in good accordance with the known correspondence
between geometric images and different degrees of happiness.

1

Formulation of the Problem

Sometimes, we need help when making a decision. In many practical
situations, we need help when making decisions. One of the reasons for this
need is that while we can meaningfully compare a few alternatives, in real life,
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there is often a huge number of alternatives, so huge that it is not realistic to
consider them all.
In such situations, a natural idea is to use a computer-based system to help
us make decisions.
What a computer-based system needs to do.
• This system will first try to understand what exactly we want, by asking
us to compare different alternatives.
• Then, the system will use this knowledge to predict how we will react
to other possible alternatives – and select an alternative that we would
(hopefully) prefer.
How exactly will the system do it. Every alternative can be characterized
by several aspects. For example, when we decide which apartment to rent, we
take into account the amount of money that we need to pay, the apartment’s
size, its distance from our workplace (and/or from our friends), on what floor
is this apartment, etc. In a big city, there are usually many apartments, with
many possible combinations of these aspects. It is not realistic to expert the
user to provide an opinion on all possible combinations of such aspects.
What we can do is:
• we can elicit a person’s opinion about each of these aspects, and then
• we can try to find the way of combining these opinions which closely
resembles how this particular person makes decisions.
How do we describe user’s preferences: decision theory’s utility-based
approach. In decision theory, user’s preferences are usually described by a
number called utility; see, e.g., [3, 7, 10, 11, 12].
Usually, for each aspect, we can describe the worst possible situation A−
among those that we can still consider – and we can describe the ideal situation A+ . Usually:
• the worst possible – but still acceptable – situation is easy to describe:
e.g., for apartment’s area, it is 10 square meters (there are actually such
mini-apartments in Hong Kong), while
• the same user can provide us with different ideal situations: 200 square
meters? a million square meters? the only limit to this is the flight of
fantasy.
Both situations A− and A+ are extreme. To describe the user’s opinion about
each intermediate situation A, we can ask the user to compare this situation A
with lotteries L(p), in which the user will:
• get the ideal situation A+ with probability p, and
• get the worst possible situation A− with the remaining probability 1 − p.
2

When p is close to 1, the lottery is almost as good as getting the ideal situation A+ , so most probably the user will prefer this lottery to a less glamorous
alternative A. We will denote this preference by A < L(p).
Vice versa, when p is close to 0, the lottery is almost as bad as the worst
alternative A− , so we expect that L(p) < A.
One can easily see that, as we increase p from 0 to 1, there will be threshold
value when L(p) < A is replaced by A < L(p), i.e., the value
u(A) = sup{p : L(p) < A} = inf{p : A < L(p)}.
This threshold value is called the utility of the alternative A.
By definition, this value has the property that for each ε > 0, we have
L(u(A) − ε) < A < L(u(A) + ε). For very small ε > 0, probabilities u(A) − ε
and u(A) + ε, and thus, the corresponding lotteries are practically indistinguishable. Thus, from the practical viewpoint, the alternative A is equivalent to the
lottery L(u(A)). We will denote this equivalence by A ≡ L(u(A)).
Important: utility is defined modulo a multiplicative constant. As we
have mentioned earlier:
• while we can usually uniquely determine the worst alternative A− ,
• we can select different alternatives as ideal ones.
What if we replace the original “ideal” alternative A+ with a slightly worse (but
still ideal) alternative A0+ ? How will this affect the numerical values of utility?
The fact that the new ideal situation A0+ is somewhat worse than the original
ideal situation A+ , i.e., that A− ≤ A0+ < A+ means that we can find its
utility u(A0+ ) in the original A+ -based scale. So, the new ideal situation A0+ is
equivalent to the lottery L(u(A0+ )), in which:
• we get A+ with probability u(A0+ ), and
• we get A− with the remaining probability 1 − u(A0+ ).
Suppose that in the new A0+ -based scale, an alternative A has utility u0 (A).
This means that the alternative A is equivalent to a lottery L0 (u0 (A)) in which:
• we get A0+ with probability u0 (A), and
• we get A− with the remaining probability 1 − u0 (A).
As we have mentioned, the alternative A0+ is, in its turn, equivalent to a lottery L(u(A0+ )). Thus, the alternative A is equivalent to a two-stage lottery, in
which:
• first, we select A0+ with probability u0 (A) and A− with the remaining
probability 1 − u0 (A), and then
• if we selected A0+ on the first stage, we select A+ with probability u(A0+ )
and A− with the remaining probability 1 − u(A0+ ).
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As a result of this two-stage lottery, we get either A+ or A− , and the probability
def
to get A+ is equal to c · u0 (A), where we denoted c = u(A0+ ). By definition, this
probability is exactly the utility u(A) in the A+ -based scale. So we conclude
that
u(A) = c · u0 (A).
In mathematical terms, we can say that utility is defined modulo multiplication a constant factor.
Towards the formulation of the problem. Our original problem is that:
• we know the preferences corresponding to each aspect, and
• we need to combine these preferences, so that we will be able to compare
different alternatives – each of which is characterized by different values
of different aspects.
As we have mentioned earlier, in decision theory, preferences are described by
utilities. In terms of the utilities, the above problem can be formulated as
follows:
• we know utilities u1 , . . . , un corresponding to all n aspects, and
• based on these values, we need to estimate the overall utility u of the
alternative.
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Analysis of the Problem and the Resulting Algorithm

What do we want? We want an operation f (a, b) that would combine two
utility values a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0 into a combined value f (a, b) ≥ 0.
We want this operation to be general, to be able to combine every two
aspects. In particular, if you swap the aspects, i.e., if what was the first aspect
will now be the second one and vice versa, we should get the same combination
result, i.e., we should have f (a, b) = f (b, a). In mathematical terms, this means
that the combination operation must be commutative.
If we need to combine utility values a, b, and c corresponding to three aspects,
then:
• we can first combine a and b into f (a, b), and then add c to this combination, resulting in f (f (a, b), c);
• alternatively, we can first combine b and c into f (b, c), and then add a to
this combination, resulting in f (a, f (b, c)).
It is reasonable to require that these two approaches lead to the same estimate,
i.e., that we have f (f (a, b), c) = f (a, f (b, c)). In mathematical terms, this means
that the combination operation must be associative.
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If one of the aspects become better, and the other remains the same, then the
overall utility should increase: if a < a0 , then we should have f (a, b) < f (a0 , b).
In mathematical terms, this means that the combination operation must be
strictly monotonic.
Finally, since utility is defined modulo a multiplicative factor, the combination result should be the same if we re-scale all the values, i.e., if f (a, b) = v
then for each c > 0, we should have f (c · a, c · b) = c · v. In mathematical terms,
this means that the combination operation must be scale-invariant.
Main result. The following two conditions are equivalent to each other for
each function f (a, b):
• the operation f (a, b) is commutative, associative, strictly monotonic, and
scale-invariant;
• the operation f (a, b) has the form
f (a, b) = (ap + bp )1/p

(1)

for some p > 0.
Proof. One can easily check that every operation f (a, b) = (ap + bp )1/p is
commutative, associative, strictly monotonic, and scale-invariant.
Vice versa, let us assume that an operation f (a, b) is commutative, associative, strictly monotonic, and scale-invariant. Strict monotonicity implies a
weaker monotonicity property, that if a ≤ a0 then f (a, b) ≤ f (a0 , b). It is
known (see, e.g., [1]) that every operation which is commutative, associative,
scale-invariant, and monotonic (in the above weaker sense) is either of the form
f (a, b) = (ap + bp )1/p for some p > 0, or has one of the three additional forms
f (a, b) = 0, f (a, b) = min(a, b) and f (a, b) = max(a, b). One can easily check
that these three additional forms are not strictly monotonic, so the only remaining form is indeed f (a, b) = (ap + bp )1/p .
The statement is proven.
Conclusion. We thus conclude that a reasonable way to combine utilities of
different aspects into a single utility value is to use the formula (1). In other
words, if an alternative has n aspects with utilities u1 , . . . , un , then a reasonable
estimate for its overall utility is
(up1 + . . . + upn )1/p .

(2)

Which value p should we choose? In general, the parameter p should be
selected to match the preferences of a specific user.
In general, a reasonable idea is to select p = 2. Indeed, in the case when
each aspect can be described by its monetary value, a natural idea is to simply
add these monetary values to get the overall monetary value. Empirical data
shows that utility is approximately proportional to the square root of the money
5

√
amount u(m) = C · m; see, e.g., [6] (a theoretical explanation for this formula
is provided in [9]).
Since utility is√defined modulo a multiplicative factor, we can re-scale utility
and get u(m) = m. So, the corresponding money amount m is equal to u2 .
If we add money amounts m1 = u21 and m2 = u22 corresponding to two aspects,
2
2
we will get the overall
p amount m = m1 + m2 = u1 + u2 that corresponds
√ money
2
2
to the utility u = m = u1 + u2 . This is exactly formula (1) for p = 2.
Comment about disutility. In some cases, instead of good situations of
looking for the best gain, we are in a not so good situation of looking for the
smallest loss. Such situations can be similarly described by disutility – negative
utility – and a similar formula can be similarly derived for combining disutilities
of different aspects into a single value.
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How Is This Related to Geometric Images of
Happiness

What is the consequence of using different values p when combining
disutilities. Ideally, we want to select an alternative that minimized disutility.
If we cannot perform an exact minimization, then at least we should select an
alternative for which the overall disutility is smaller than a certain pre-defined
value u0 .
In view of the above formula, this means selecting an alternative for which
(up1 + . . . + upn )1/p ≤ u0 .

What happens when we change p? It is known that the expression
(up1 + . . . + upn )1/p
decreases as p increases: if p < p0 , then
0

0

0

(up1 + . . . + upn )1/p < (up1 + . . . + upn )1/p .
Thus, if an alternative with certain values of u1 , . . . , un was acceptable for some
value p, it is will be acceptable for all larger values p0 > p.
So, the larger p, the more alternative are acceptable – and thus, the more
choices a person has.
• When p is very small, few alternatives are acceptable – in other words,
the situation is very gloomy.
• On the other hand, when p increases, more and more alternatives will
become acceptable – and thus, the whole situation will feel less and less
gloomy.
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From this viewpoint, the value p can be viewed as a measure of a person’s
satisfaction with a situation, as a measure of – if you want – happiness (please
take into account that we are talking about avoiding losses, so happiness is a
relative term here).
Geometric images of happiness. Interestingly, according to [2, 4, 5, 8], a
proper geometric image of happiness is exactly the 2-D version of the above set:
the set of all the points (u1 , u2 ) for which (up1 + up2 )1/p ≤ u0 . Out of these sets:
• sets with larger p correspond to larger degree of happiness, while
• sets corresponding to p ≈ 0 correspond to unhappiness.
Thus, our analysis provides a theoretical explanation for this empirical fact.
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